Former Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov believes that Russia’s leadership harbors dangerous ambitions to restore the Russian Empire — not only to conquer Ukraine and Georgia, but also Poland, the Baltic states, and the entirety of Eastern Europe.

In an exclusive interview with InterpressNews, the former Defense Minister noted that Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web clearly demonstrated to the world that the long-standing stereotype of Russia possessing the second largest army in the world has once again been shattered. In reality, he said, Russia is a “paper tiger.”

Oleksii Reznikov also expressed his hope to “return Georgia to the civilized world,” recalling how Georgia had inspired Ukraine for many years by establishing a completely new style of governance in the post-Soviet space.

What damage did Operation Spider Web inflict on Russia? To what extent were foreign partners involved in its planning? And will the negotiations held in Turkey yield real results? - Former Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov spoke about these and other issues in his exclusive interview with InterpressNews.

Ukraine’s recent Operation Spider Web has drawn global attention, with reports suggesting it damaged over a third of Russia’s strategic air fleet—causing an estimated $7 billion in losses. According to Ukrainian media, the operation was prepared for 18 months and the Russians knew nothing about it. As Ukraine’s former Minister of Defense, how would you evaluate the strategic significance of this operation? What does it reveal about Ukraine’s evolving military capabilities?

I'll start speaking from 2022, when it was the beginning of the war. In all Western media, there was a very popular cognitive bias that Kyiv, after the case of full-scale invasion, would fall during 72 hours or three days. Today, after more than three years, we are fighting back efficiently. And during this period, Ukrainian armed forces and all other types of our defense sector mostly used Soviet-era legacy weaponry. During this war—I mean this open part of the war, because this war started in 2014, when Russians occupied Crimea and Luhansk and Donetsk—we got a lot of weaponry from our partners, all types of NATO-standard weaponry.

It includes air defense systems like Patriot, NASAMS, IRIS-T, Stamp-t etc.; battle tanks like Leopard, Challenger, Abrams, IMAX-10. I call it an artillery zoo, because we have more than nine different types: French, German, British, Belgian, American, Slovak, Polish, and Ukrainian weaponry as well. But during this war, we developed our Ukrainian cutting-edge technology. First of all, electronic warfare, different types of drones—reconnaissance drones, UAVs, striking drones, sea drones, land-on-the-ground drones, etc. And it means that this war is the last conventional war on the globe. We have a typical new type of hybrid war, where we still use old-fashioned weaponry and cutting-edge technology as well.

Now back to your question. Operation Spider Web was done using only new types of electronic warfare. Yes, it took a long time, 18 months, but we did it on enemy soil. Maybe we can compare it with the previous very famous Israeli Pagers operation. But I would say that the Spider Web operation, for me, looks more sophisticated and more surprising, especially for our enemies.

We have to talk about the consequences of this operation. This operation had not only political or informational consequences but real consequences, which means that the Russian side lost at minimum 30% of their potential to use striking aircraft for ballistic and cruise missiles. They call it Nuclear Triada.

In 1991, Ukraine signed the very famous Budapest Memorandum, and Ukraine refused to be a nuclear country. And after the signing, Ukraine gave to Russia a lot of aircraft too. And Russia was a guarantor of this Budapest Memorandum—a guarantor of our independence, our security, our integrity. And they ruined this guarantee. They became our enemy. They came to Ukraine with a full-scale invasion. It is funny that we destroyed these aircraft, which we gave them in the 1990s.

This operation showed to the world that the misunderstanding or cognitive bias that Russia has the second army in the world was ruined again. Because we see that Russia, in reality, is a paper tiger.

Do you believe the damage will have long-term effects on Russia’s air force?

It's a good question. First of all, they will try to arrange slightly different types of security, clearing, and trying to find new tracks with the new drones on their roads. It will be a traffic jam on their roads. So, they will have atrocity and disaster on their roads. It's also a good consequence. And as I heard from the engineers, Russia does not have the capability to rebuild or restore these aircraft. It's impossible for them.

Was Operation Spider Web conducted with the knowledge or support of Ukraine’s international allies? To what extent were foreign partners involved in planning or intelligence sharing?

I saw the readout from the White House that Ukraine didn't inform them. I don't know, honestly. But in any case, if I did know, I would not react anyway, because, as a former minister or as a current minister—doesn't matter—I would not have the right to say that.

We are fighting alone. We started fighting alone in February 2022, when a lot of our partners were sure that we would fall during three days. But then they saw that we fought three days, three weeks, three months—they changed their mind, and they started to help us. We have to be strong. And we will plan our operations without any permission from our friends. Unfortunately, for the civilized world, every time they are thinking about the so-called red lines.

And I will add that, especially if we are talking about the United States, we have to keep in mind that during the very famous meeting in the Oval Office, the current President of the United States, Donald Trump, called himself a mediator. He chose this role. I'm fine with that. But if he chose the role as a mediator between two sides—two conflicting sides—what's the reason for one of the sides to inform the mediator that they will do something enforceable?

Since Donald Trump took office as US president, Washington’s support for Kyiv has been called into question, and it is still unclear what role Donald Trump, who promised to end the Russia-Ukraine war in one day, will play. Donald Trump recently suggested that Russia holds the “cards” in hand in negotiations and that reaching an agreement with Moscow would be easier than with Kyiv, claiming Ukraine lacks “the cards.” How do you respond to this characterization? Do you believe Ukraine’s recent military successes challenge that narrative and now Kyiv “also has the cards”?

First of all, this is a negotiation process. This is not bilateral. It's a multilateral negotiation. When you're starting all types of negotiation, you have to recognize the interests of the sides. There are interests of Ukraine, certainly; there are interests of Russia; there are interests of the United States; there are interests of European countries at minimum.

Additionally, behind Russia, there are interests of China, North Korea, and other parts of their allies, like Iran and Iraq. And this negotiation process cannot be completed in one stage or two stages. If we use a movie context, it's like a TV series with many seasons.

We would like to finish this war as soon as possible. But in reality, this war started in 2004. Then Ukraine chose the European way, and we didn't allow a president who was a proxy of Russia—Viktor Yanukovych. Ukrainians, using the Maidan, Orange Revolution, and the decision of the Supreme Court, chose and got the new liberal democratic president, Viktor Yushchenko. I know it very well because I was his lawyer. I represented him in 2004 in the Supreme Court, and we won this case in the Supreme Court.

But I think that personally, the Russian leader was humiliated by the Ukrainians because they refused to be under the control of the Russian empire again. We got the decision of NATO in the Bucharest summit; then they refused to give full-fledged NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine. After that, we saw the invasion of Georgia by Russian armed troops. After that, we saw the invasion of Ukraine—in Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk. It's a complete case from the Russian side—from the empire.

The new president—new and former president of the United States at the same time—Donald Trump, looks unpredictable. But he is a businessman. He is a businessman from New York, from Brooklyn. They have a special style and also a special vocabulary. And when they use, “you have no cards,” this is not a humiliating sentence.

This is the slang of the businessman from New York, from Brooklyn especially, because I discussed it with my friends while living in New York. It means you have fewer arguments than your counterpart. Yes, again, in 2022, a lot of countries—including the US—did not estimate Ukraine at the real level of our capacity.

The second round of Russian-Ukrainian peace talks was recently held in Istanbul. While Ukraine reportedly submitted a draft memorandum, it remains unclear whether Russia responded in kind. What is your assessment of this round of negotiations, and do you see any realistic path toward a peace agreement in the near future?

Honestly, it's very hard to estimate this round because it's a short part of a serious process. I was a member of the Ukrainian delegation two years at the table with the Russians because I was the deputy head of the Ukrainian delegation during the Minsk negotiations. And also, I helped the political advisor to our president Zelensky, Andriy Yermak, in Normandy—in Paris and Berlin. I met Russians many, many times. After that, after the full-scale invasion, I was also involved in three rounds in Belarus and one round in Istanbul in February, March, and April 2022. And I know very well that just one meeting doesn't mean something very special. It's just the attempt to compare and recognize the interests of sides. It's the presenting of demands and discussion. What they say in front of the cameras—TV cameras and photo cameras—is absolutely not congruent with what they say at the table and behind closed doors.

Moscow’s conditions—such as Ukraine renouncing NATO ambitions, reducing troop numbers, and recognizing occupied regions as Russian—remain firm. In light of Ukraine’s successful military operations, do you foresee any softening of Russia’s stance? Is Ukraine open to any form of compromise on these issues in order to achieve peace?

There is nothing new for me. The same demands I heard in February and March in 2022. There is nothing new. They tried to push us to the polite, soft variant of capitulation. We refused. After three years, they come back with the same architecture of their approach. This is a classical Russian approach—from this side with the position of power, with the position of strength, with the position of force. But again, the situation on the battlefield—the situation in Odessa, Kursk operation, Spider Net, and other examples—shows that Russia is a paper tiger. I remember the situation three years ago. Honestly, my estimation is that this current delegation from the Russian side does not have a real mandate to sign the agreement. They're playing their role. They have no subjectivity. They have no power to negotiate and achieve a result.

And to your second question, we have our constitution as a fundamental law. In the constitution, it was fixed that NATO aspiration is our way. It's a part of our integrity and a part of our independence. Only Ukraine, only Ukrainian people, the Ukrainian parliament, can change the constitution and choose a new approach. It's our right to choose which allies should be on our side—European Union, NATO, or something else.

And what reason do we have to refuse to recognize our territory? In 1991, the Ukrainian state was recognized internationally, including by the Russian Federation, within our borders, including Crimea and Luhansk and Donetsk.

Russia planned to occupy us in three days. We are fighting back for more than three years. According to my understanding, the Ukrainian people will not give a mandate to delegations to refuse our territories.

There is no scenario at this moment that we will see a new security architecture or new security guarantees for us which we will believe. We have a very bad example of this—I mean the Budapest Memorandum, which was signed by the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, and after that, France joined this memorandum. According to it, they would guarantee our independence, our dignity, our integrity—and instead, we gave up our nuclear weapons.

Russia's leadership has crazy inspirations to restore the Russian Empire, to conquer not only Ukraine or Georgia, but to conquer Poland, the Baltic countries, and to reach the Berlin Wall again.

In your view, how and when could the Russia-Ukraine war be over? Do you anticipate any significant turning points in the conflict this summer?

I'm an optimist—always, all my life. And it helped me to survive and helped me to stay alive psychologically, first of all. And I also hope and pray to God that we can finish this war during the summer, during this year. But simultaneously, I understand that this is a marathon, and we need to keep our minds, to keep our health, to keep our energy, and restore our energy as human beings, and also as a country, and also as our defense sector—and to be prepared for worst-case scenarios, certainly.

This is a new type of war. That's why Russians are using offensive style—sending soldiers, including North Korean soldiers—using the meat grinder tactics. Behind them, Russian soldiers with rifles. If they come back, they will kill them. It's a classical Russian approach from the Stalin era.

And for me, the massive attacking offensive campaign looks strange, impossible. It's a war. There is blood, losses, killed in action, wounded soldiers—from both sides.

You served as Ukraine’s Minister of Defense during a critical period following the full-scale invasion of Russia on February 24, 2022. What were some of the most significant challenges the country faced during your time in office, and how were they overcome? Also, how would you characterize President Zelensky’s leadership throughout this war?

For me, the main challenge was to persuade our partners that Ukraine can win this war. They had to help us and give us serious numbers and quantities of modern weaponry. During the first months and first weeks, they gave us only short-range weaponry like Light Anti-Tank Weapon (NLAW), Javelin, Starstreak, and Stingers. They had the capacity to ruin Russian tanks, Russian helicopters at a distance of 2.5 kilometers—maximum 4.

The main idea was to persuade them that we will fight back efficiently, and we will stay because we have resilience and resistance capacity. And it doesn't matter how much manpower Russia has, because it's similar to a Bible story about David and Goliath. David used his brave approach, and he was smart—using the sling with the stones—and he defeated Goliath. That was the main challenge for us. And we did it.

As I mentioned, we got everything during my tenure as a minister—artillery, tanks, aircraft, and air defense systems.

President Zelensky—he's an unbelievable, unpredictable guy. He's very brave and smart. I saw it many, many times. He didn't refuse. He kept his energy, and he searches very deep in any type of information. He discussed everything with the Minister of Finance, Minister of Energy, Minister of Transportation, or Defense Minister.

He has a special charisma, like chemistry, to persuade prime ministers, presidents, kings, and other leaders of the world to listen to him, to understand him, and respect him. Because if they hear him, if they respect him, they will believe him, and they will believe in Ukraine.

And I'm still surprised how he can survive under this level of stress—24 hours, seven days per week—he has phone conversations, communications, speeches to parliaments, traveling, visiting the frontline, visiting veterans, visiting other countries. It's unbelievable for me. And I think Ukraine—we are very lucky that we got this leader for these tough times.

With Karol Nawrocki’s election as Poland’s new conservative president, how do you foresee Ukrainian-Polish relations evolving? Could this shift affect Ukraine’s aspirations for EU integration?

First of all, I believe that the real Polish-Ukrainian relationship will still be very warm and friendly, and I call it brotherhood—because I appreciate what Polish people did for us, especially after February 2022. Poland became the main logistic hub for us when Western aid was flowing via Poland to Ukraine. And I visited Poland probably every month during my tenure as a transition zone.

I spoke to Polish people in restaurants, in a bar, on the street, in the airport—and I heard a lot of supporting words. Also, I'm honored to be awarded by the previous president of Poland. I have a silver medal from the president of Poland, and I have some Polish roots as well.

We have a joint background, and we will have a joint future together. And I think that it is in Poland’s interest to build up new security architecture in Europe together with the Baltic countries, together with Ukraine, Great Britain, and other countries.

Russia has the intention to come back to Warsaw, to occupy Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia. I hope that the new president of Poland will recognize that it is in Poland’s interest to be together with the Ukrainians.

We have to keep in mind that approximately—at minimum—four or five million Ukrainians live in Poland right now. So I’m looking very optimistically into the future with it.

The ongoing war in Ukraine is extremely important for Georgia. The majority of our country’s population still firmly supports Ukraine and stands in solidarity against the aggression that the Ukrainian people have been enduring for more than 3 years. In 2022, discussions emerged in Georgia about opening a “second front” against Russia. Some Georgian officials claimed that Western powers were pressuring Georgia to enter the war. From your perspective, would such a development have benefited Ukraine militarily or strategically?

When I heard this the first time, I thought this is a new type of information campaign. Because only Georgian people have the right to decide how to react on their territory. You have your integrity, you have your sovereignty, you have your rights.

I have a lot of friends in Georgia and we're still keeping our warm relations. And I know that they helped my relatives after this war started. I know that in 2008, when Russian armed forces moved to Tbilisi, Ukraine supported Georgia and Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko gave the order to give to Georgia our weaponry. We didn't have a lot of, but we did it.

And I really believe that your country has a good perspective to be an EU country, because it was our joint movement in 2008 in the Bucharest summit to be full-fledged members of NATO. It was our joint movement together—Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—with the European inspirations.

When I was a Vice Prime Minister and a minister who was responsible for the reintegration of temporarily occupied territories, I tried to rebuild this union—Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—and move to Europe together. Unfortunately, something changed in your country.

But again, I'm an optimist. And I believe that Georgian people would be wise, and you will have a good democratic European perspective.

Members of the ruling party in Georgia frequently speak of a “Deep State” as an influential force that rules the world from behind the curtains. Recently, they have called the Deep State the Brussels bureaucracy that interferes in the affairs of other countries, including the internal affairs of Ukraine and Georgia. Why do you think this narrative is being promoted, and is the concept of a “Deep State” relevant in Ukraine?

When I hear that, I have two reactions.

First reaction—maybe more traditional—because for me, the meaning of Deep State is that it's something in the United States' soil, which is keeping democracy in this country. Doesn’t matter who is the president, doesn’t matter who is a member of Congress or Senate—Deep State is something which was fixed by the Constitution of the United States.

According to the situation in Georgia, for me it sounds like an echo of the Russian propaganda information campaign. I hear behind these words the Moscow narratives, which we hear every day during this war with Russia.

In Ukrainian politics, there is no discussion about Deep State at all.

Since stepping down as Defense Minister in September 2023, what is your professional field of activity after leaving the post? Are you considering a return to politics in the future?

Currently, I have an academic career. I am a lecturer at one university and two academies in Kyiv.

Last summer, I created my personal course of seminars about the practical aspects of negotiation, using my cases: Ramstein meetings, bilateral meetings, 52 ministers, 52 delegations, and negotiation with the Russians during the Minsk process and others.

As a lawyer, in my career, I got a lot of amicable agreements and settlements because I was a negotiator for more than 30 years. Also, I'm a distinguished fellow of the very famous GLOBSEC Forum.

And I'm not going to come back to the political sphere, because honestly, I don't like political life. And my wife told me it's enough for us.

And I'm trying to live for my family, for my kids, for my grandsons, for my wife, certainly for my friends and for myself. I am not going to involve in politics anymore.

Thank you. This was my final question. If there is something you would like to add, you can use this chance.

I just would like to wish you that Georgia will come back to the civilized world, because you inspired us many, many years ago when you fought with the corruption, when you fought with the criminals, when you set up absolutely a new style of governance on the former Soviet territory.

It was amazing. I visited Tbilisi many times. I like your landscape, your mountains, Georgian culture.

And it is a pity to see what is going on in your country. I really believe that we have a good perspective future—both our countries.

Beka Beriashvili

InterpressNews